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Introduction
Following the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) in December 2015, governments around the 
world now face the task of developing strategies to meet their 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) – 
UN terminology for emissions reduction goals to 2030 – and 
their broader contributions to the Paris Agreement’s goal 
of maintaining global average temperatures to well below 
2°C above pre-industrial levels (UNFCCC, 2015a, article 
2.1(a)). Paris represented a crucial starting point, but the 
decisions by Paula Bennett, New Zealand’s new minister for 
climate change issues, and her international counterparts will 
determine whether COP21 
produced just warm words 
or genuinely charted a course 
to avoid the worst impacts 
of human-induced climate 
change.
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New Zealand do?
New Zealand’s climate mitigation policies 
have received sustained criticism for lacking 
ambition and for failing to provide credible 
incentives to reduce emissions (Bertram 
and Terry, 2010; Richter and Chambers, 
2014). When the government ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 it pledged to 
return New Zealand’s emissions to 1990 
levels by 2008–12. This was achieved, but 
mainly through forest sinks allowed under 
Kyoto accounting rules and purchasing 
overseas credits rather than through 
sustained decarbonisation of its economy. 
Excluding land use, land-use change and 
forestry, New Zealand’s emissions rose by 
19% over the period, although it retains 
Page 4 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 12, Issue 2 – May 2016
New Zealand and Climate Change: what are the stakes and what can New Zealand do?
a large surplus of unused emissions units 
generated by land-use credits (Ministry 
for the Environment, 2013).
In 2012 the government declined to 
offer a legally-binding emissions target 
under the second Kyoto commitment 
period, and instead adopted an 
unconditional but non-binding target 
under the UNFCCC to reduce emissions 
to 5% below 1990 levels by 2020 before 
establishing new goals to 2030 under 
the Paris Agreement (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2015a). The government 
duly published its INDC, but its 
conditional goal, to reduce New Zealand’s 
emissions to 11% below 1990 levels by 
2030 (New Zealand, 2015), has been rated 
as ‘inadequate’ by Climate Action Tracker 
(Rocha et al., 2015) for not charting a 
direct path to its goal of a 50% reduction 
by 2050 and for potentially storing up 
future climate and financial liabilities.
Since 2008 the New Zealand emissions 
trading scheme (ETS) has provided the 
main domestic framework for achieving 
cost-effective emissions reductions across 
a range of sectors (Kerr, 2007). However, 
revisions to the scheme since 2009 have 
weakened its settings and it is questionable 
whether it provides meaningful 
incentives for consumers or target sectors 
(Stroombergen, 2011). Among the ETS’s 
main weaknesses identified by Bertram 
and Terry (2010), Richter and Chambers 
(2014) and Palmer (2015) are:
•	 the	absence	of	an	overall	emissions	
cap to create certainty over the 
emissions framework within which 
affected sectors must operate; 
•	 the	introduction	in	2009	of	a	ceiling	
price of NZ$25 per tonne of carbon 
dioxide equivalent, which places built-
in constraints on the ETS’s ability to 
influence investment and consumer 
decisions (see also Bullock, 2012); 
•	 that	under	transitional	arrangements	
scheduled to end in 2012 but 
extended until at least 2016, 
industrial processes, stationary 
energy and liquid fossil fuels are 
required to surrender only one New 
Zealand unit (NZU) for every two 
tonnes of emissions, further eroding 
abatement incentives;
•	 a	historical	dependence	on	
international credits that further 
depressed the NZU price and 
deterred post-1989 foresters from 
entering the scheme to generate 
offset units; although the use of 
international credits has become 
more limited, the 2015–16 NZU 
price has not yet exceeded NZ$15;
•	 the	open-ended	exclusion	of	
agricultural methane and nitrous 
oxide despite their high contribution 
to New Zealand emissions (Cooper, 
Boston and Bright, 2013);
•	 a	lack	of	other	sector-specific	
measures to complement the carbon 
price.
While this track record raises 
questions about New Zealand’s capacity, 
or inclination, to meet the challenges 
created by the Paris Agreement,1 the 
government has responded by initiating 
a further review of the ETS to examine 
how the scheme should evolve to help 
New Zealand meet its obligations cost 
effectively and be well prepared for 
further strengthening of international 
responses to climate change (Ministry for 
the Environment, 2015b).
The aim of this article is to contribute 
to this process of policy reflection by 
exploring strategic options for New 
Zealand to accelerate its emissions 
reduction. The distinctive element of this 
analysis is its critical analysis of the main 
narratives that have shaped recent New 
Zealand climate policy, identified from 
published documents and 23 interviews 
with politicians, government officials, 
industry leaders and independent 
commentators in 2015.2 The general 
tone of these narratives, we argue, 
portrays New Zealand’s climate policy 
options as inherently constrained by its 
inability to influence global emissions 
and the economic risks of adopting 
more ambitious climate measures. These 
narratives are then subjected to critical 
scrutiny through a review of the major 
stakes facing New Zealand on climate 
issues, before the final sections of the 
article explore how some constraints 
might be reinterpreted to advance key 
aspects of New Zealand’s mitigation 
policy while still guarding against 
identified economic and social risks.
Climate policy narratives in New Zealand
During our investigations, interviewees 
identified a number of lines of reasoning 
used to legitimate New Zealand’s current 
approach to climate policy, that were 
then consolidated into the following New 
Zealand climate policy narratives.
New Zealand is a small country
New Zealand produces only around 0.2% 
of global emissions, so can do little to 
influence climate change. This makes 
economic sacrifices futile in climate or 
welfare terms, and leadership should 
instead come from larger countries, 
with New Zealand playing a respectable 
following role.
New Zealand has an unconventional 
emissions profile
Agriculture contributes nearly 50% 
of New Zealand’s national emissions, 
unlike in most OECD countries where 
the average is 12% (NZAGRC/PGGRC, 
2015). Current technologies to cut 
biological emissions (over 75% of this 
total) are problematic and/or costly. Even 
then, methane is a short-lived greenhouse 
gas, so atmospheric stocks of agricultural 
methane should remain roughly constant 
unless livestock numbers increase. New 
The government duly published its INDC, 
but its conditional goal, to reduce New 
Zealand’s emissions to 11% below 1990 
levels by 2030 ... has been rated as 
‘inadequate’ by Climate Action Tracker ... 
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Zealand agriculture is also economically 
and emissions efficient, so pricing 
emissions without feasible abatement 
technologies may damage the economy 
by shifting production overseas without 
producing climate benefits. Land use, 
land-use change and forestry, meanwhile, 
provides carbon sinks of around 26.6 
million tonnes (equivalent to 35% of New 
Zealand emissions) (UNFCCC, 2015b), 
but while forestry can offset emissions from 
other sectors, its contribution depends on 
the prevailing balance between planting 
and harvesting, and higher ETS prices.
New Zealand is a growing country with a 
specialised economic base
Sustained population growth creates 
serious obstacles to absolute emissions 
reduction and leaves New Zealand reliant 
on overseas credits to meet international 
targets. Higher targets and carbon prices 
also risk undermining New Zealand’s 
specialised and export-oriented economy 
until trading partners in Asia and North 
America also introduce economy-
wide carbon pricing (a national ETS is 
scheduled in China in 2017). Emissions 
targets are thus seen as a financial liability 
for the government and taxpayers, 
rather than emphasis being placed on 
the environmental and social threats of 
climate change.
New Zealand’s electricity sector is already 
low-carbon 
New Zealand has limited capacity to reduce 
emissions from electricity generation 
because 80% of electricity already comes 
from renewable sources. There is bipartisan 
support for 90% renewable electricity by 
2025, and New Zealand already produces 
682 megawatts of wind energy. However, 
2,000 megawatts of consented capacity 
has not been constructed because of 
the low ETS price (New Zealand Wind 
Energy Association, 2013, 2015). Closure 
of the remaining coal-fired generators at 
the Huntly power station in 2022 should 
give renewables added momentum, but 
further policy support may be needed to 
progress this agenda.
Tackling transport emissions is problematic
Cutting transport emissions is challenging 
because New Zealand’s sparse population 
outside its major cities restricts economies 
of scale in low-carbon transport systems 
(Bertram and Terry, 2010). The electric 
vehicle market is expanding but has limited 
investment, while the lack of domestic 
vehicle manufacturing and high numbers 
of older vehicles mean that transforming 
transport emissions remains a long-term 
ambition. The 4 cents per litre surcharge 
on unleaded petrol (retail price NZ$2) 
imposed by the ETS is unlikely to trigger 
tangible shifts to lower-carbon travel.
Emissions trading is all that is needed
Several interviewees remarked that 
strong neoliberal thinking in key areas of 
government spurred the decision to adopt 
an ETS as a cost-effective way of meeting 
emissions targets (following the failure 
of the carbon tax proposal), but has also 
prompted an aversion to complementary 
measures on the grounds of avoiding 
regulatory ‘double jeopardy’ and reduced 
economic efficiency within climate policy. 
Although New Zealand has some sectoral 
goals – such as 90% renewable electricity, 
higher electric vehicle numbers and 
reducing agricultural emissions (New 
Zealand Government, 2015a) – most 
receive limited support. According to this 
reasoning, such measures are unnecessary 
because the ETS price signal should 
generate behavioural shifts throughout 
the economy. 
We use the term ‘narratives’ rather 
than ‘factors’ to describe these issues 
because, like any political discourse, 
they represent lines of argument used 
by political actors to legitimate New 
Zealand’s current approach to climate 
policy. This does not mean that they lack 
factual legitimacy, because New Zealand’s 
economy is specialised and trade-
exposed, its emissions profile is skewed 
towards agriculture and forestry, reducing 
biological emissions is technically 
demanding, and New Zealand’s climate 
future does depend on actions by larger 
countries. It is, nevertheless, important 
to recognise that they rest on certain 
assumptions and contentions (Bailey 
and Wilson, 2009; Dryzek, 2013), in 
this case stressing the difficulties of 
reducing emissions and the economic 
risks of stronger targets to justify current 
ETS settings and unrestricted access to 
international units to mitigate risks. It 
is such subjective judgements that make 
critical interrogation of these narratives 
essential to identifying future possibilities 
for New Zealand climate policy in the 
post-Paris era.
Climate policy: what are the other stakes for 
New Zealand?
Climate impacts
A logical starting point for assessing the 
climate policy stakes facing New Zealand 
is to examine projected climate impacts 
on the country. Some scenarios postulated 
by the National Institute of Water and 
Atmospheric Research and the Ministry 
for the Environment stress both negative 
and positive outcomes, including reduced 
winter heating and increased spring pasture 
growth, while the New Zealand Climate 
Change Centre recently concluded that 
‘as a temperate maritime country, New 
Zealand may not face some of the worst 
effects of climate change this century’ 
(Hollis, 2015, p.1). The fifth assessment 
report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change nevertheless highlights a 
number of climate risks to New Zealand:
[New Zeand] emissions profile is 
skewed towards agriculture and 
forestry, reducing biological emissions 
is technically demanding, and New 
Zealand’s climate future does depend on 
actions by larger countries.
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•	 reduced	precipitation	in	the	northern	
and eastern North Island, with 
increases in other parts of New 
Zealand;
•	 increases	in	regional	sea-level	rise	
above historical rates recorded 
between 1971 and 2010, which, 
combined with increasing heavy 
rainfall, may result in increased 
erosion, inundation and damage to 
low-lying ecosystems, infrastructure 
and housing;
•	 substantial	economic	losses	arising	
from recent droughts in 2007–09 
(leading to losses of NZ$3.9 billion 
in direct and off-farm output) and 
2012–13;
•	 increased	damage	to	ecosystems	and	
settlements and risks to human life 
across New Zealand driven by rising 
temperatures and drying trends. 
(Reisinger et al., 2014)
Although the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change also notes the 
adaptive capacity of human systems, 
it argues that implementation is often 
constrained by inconsistent information 
bases and uncertainties about projected 
impacts; limited financial and human 
resources to assess local risks and 
develop effective policies; limited 
integration between governance levels; 
lack of guidance on principles and 
priorities; different attitudes towards 
climate risks; and different values placed 
on objects and places at risk. It also 
identifies that indigenous peoples often 
have higher than average exposure to 
climate impacts due to a heavy reliance 
on climate-sensitive primary industries 
and strong social connections to the 
natural environment.
Such projections give reasons to be 
apprehensive about the effects of climate 
change on New Zealand’s more climate-
dependent strategic industries. Agriculture 
and forestry contributed around 10% of 
GDP in 2014 (and more when related 
retailing and tourism are included), 
while agriculture, forestry and fisheries 
comprised around 60% of New Zealand’s 
exports (New Zealand Government, 
2015b). The effects of climate impacts on 
the Pacific Islands (in terms of migration 
and financial assistance), meanwhile, 
further underscore the threats of climate 
change to New Zealand’s economic and 
social well-being.3
Despite these risks, New Zealand 
still faces asymmetrical risks because its 
actions will have minimal direct impact 
on global emissions and its adaptation 
liabilities. It can urge other countries 
to act, and control its mitigation costs 
through how it calibrates its climate 
policies, but, in the absence of more 
concerted global action, higher targets 
and increased carbon prices are likely to 
intensify economic burdens unless they 
spur leadership advantages in developing 
and commercialising new low-emissions 
technologies. We discuss some possibilities 
later in the article.
The costs of caution
Beyond direct mitigation and adaptation 
costs, other, less quantifiable risks require 
consideration when contemplating the 
climate threats facing New Zealand. The 
first is lost trade if New Zealand is judged to 
be not responding actively to climate and 
other sustainability demands (Chapman, 
2015). Although studies indicate that 
consumers are reluctant to pay more for 
socially responsible products, they also 
show a greater willingness to pay among 
younger, more affluent, educated, urban 
and politically liberal people, and where 
products benefit humans compared with 
benefiting the environment (Royne, Levy 
and Martinez, 2011; Tully and Winer, 
2014). Several trends are worth noting 
here: the growth in the numbers of 
middle-class consumers in major Asian 
markets; growing public appreciation 
of climate change as a human as well as 
an environmental issue; and important 
differences between the take-up of 
environmentally friendly products and 
rejection of those seen as socially or 
environmentally less desirable. It should 
also be remembered that New Zealand’s 
export economy operates at the end of 
lengthy supply chains and has limited 
influence even in its main markets. For 
example, total annual US milk production 
increased by 16 million tonnes between 
2004 and 2014, equivalent to 84.5% of 
New Zealand’s entire production, while 
China’s production rose by 14.3 million 
tonnes and India’s by 25.6 million tonnes 
over the same period (US Department of 
Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service, 
2015). Although New Zealand remains an 
emissions-efficient agricultural producer 
(NZAGRC/PGGRC, 2015), it may miss 
important opportunities to reinforce its 
competitive advantages if it fails to show 
a strong lead in reducing agricultural 
emissions. Either way, the cut in global 
milk solids prices in 2015 (costing the 
rural economy over $2.5 billion) provided 
a stark reminder of New Zealand’s 
vulnerability in global agricultural 
markets (Lin and Piddock, 2015).
The second issue concerns potential 
costs to New Zealand’s international 
reputation. New Zealand has always 
prided itself on its ‘clean green’ image 
and reputation as a responsible partner 
on international issues. However, 
numerous responses to the consultation 
on New Zealand’s INDC argued that the 
government’s stance was eroding this 
reputation. As one noted:
Without a real action plan to reduce 
climate pollution, the Government 
risks damaging our global reputation 
and wrecking our economy. Most 
Although studies indicate that consumers 
are reluctant to pay more for socially 
responsible products, they also show 
a greater willingness to pay among 
younger, more affluent, educated, urban 
and politically liberal people ...
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importantly, they are denying 
New Zealanders a cleaner, smarter 
and safer future … I want to see 
meaningful policy changes that will 
start cutting New Zealand’s emissions 
during this term of government. 
(Ministry for the Environment, 
2015c, p.8)
While the government emphasised 
the extent of its consultation when 
announcing its INDC, specifics on how 
comments received influenced the target 
remain unclear. Equally, Cabinet papers 
accompanying the announcement of the 
INDC indicate differences in opinion 
within government, with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade arguing that New 
Zealand needed to adopt and meet a target 
that showed demonstrable progression 
beyond previous under-takings, whereas 
Treasury doubted that New Zealand 
would lose negotiating influence (see 
Box 1) (Cabinet Economic Growth and 
Infrastructure Committee, 2015). The 
minister determined that the INDC 
achieved a balance between preserving 
New Zealand’s international reputation and 
managing costs. However, assessment of the 
INDC by Climate Action Tracker (Rocha et 
al., 2015) deemed it to be inadequate inter 
alia for not reducing per capita emissions 
prior to 2030. This suggests that while the 
sentiment of upholding New Zealand’s 
international reputation existed, the policy 
substance failed to reflect shifts in thinking 
by other world leaders in the run-up to the 
Paris conference.
A third opportunity cost comes from 
New Zealand becoming a bystander in 
the roll-out of low-carbon technologies. 
Its distance from major markets makes 
it harder for New Zealand to become a 
global clean-technology manufacturer, 
though it could carve out innovation 
niches, as Denmark and the Netherlands 
have in renewable energy. But even 
without outright leadership, scope exists 
for New Zealand to use its capacity for 
governance and technological innovation 
to build a strong reputation in its 
specialist areas. What types of innovation 
niche might arise, and their timing, scale 
and distribution of benefits are difficult 
to predict, but some possibilities are 
discussed in the next section.
Summing up, although the prevailing 
narratives shaping New Zealand climate 
policy each have a factual base, they do 
not constitute a full and balanced account 
of the stakes facing New Zealand on 
climate change. In particular, they appear 
to have steered the country towards 
underestimating the consequences of 
inaction; a view that the ETS, and the ETS 
alone, offers decarbonisation solutions; 
and seeing challenges as constraints 
rather than seeking opportunities to show 
leadership in reducing domestic and 
global emissions. Accordingly, we now 
discuss some options New Zealand might 
pursue to contribute more actively to 
domestic and global mitigation efforts.
What can New Zealand contribute to action 
on climate change?
Emissions targets
Emissions targets are central to any 
ambition to accelerate the mitigation 
potential of New Zealand’s climate 
policies. That said, New Zealand’s small 
contribution to global emissions means 
that any link between national targets and 
future climate impacts on New Zealand 
are likely to arise chiefly from influencing 
larger nations rather than their stand-alone 
effects. Most independent commentators 
saw New Zealand’s INDC as ‘disappointing’, 
although several government and 
industry respondents maintained that it 
represented a comparable effort to those 
of other developed countries and a major 
departure from business as usual (New 
Zealand, 2015).
Two main options exist for New 
Zealand to influence domestic and 
international policy through target 
setting. The first would be to follow 
Canada’s example by incorporating an 
immediate re-examination of targets 
into the government’s post-Paris review 
of the ETS (Government of Canada, 
2015; Ministry for the Environment, 
2015b).4 Such a symbolic gesture may 
help reaffirm New Zealand’s reputation 
as a leader and power broker on climate 
issues if it can encourage other countries 
to follow suit. However, a major shift 
in commitments so soon after Paris 
seems improbable, while a unilateral 
move would expose New Zealand to 
‘first mover’ disadvantages. Additionally, 
the government does not enjoy similar 
freedom to distance itself from its 
predecessor’s policies as was available to 
the new Liberal Party administration in 
Canada, even with a new climate minister. 
Any policy shift at present would require 
robust justification and may lead to 
accusations of inconsistency.
The more feasible option is for New 
Zealand to adjust its INDC incrementally 
using the five-yearly reviews established 
at COP21 (UNFCCC, 2015a) to allow 
Box 1 
Cabinet Economic Growth and Infrastructure 
Committee comments on New Zealand’s  
international standing on climate change
1.  New Zealand would lose negotiating influence by taking a less  
stringent target than proposed.
Precedent suggests this is not a given, or that the impact may be temporary. 
For example, New Zealand declined to take its pre-2020 target under the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2012. This had some impact at the time, but has not prevented us 
from pursuing our key negotiating priorities for the post-2020 Agreement since 
then.
3.  A less stringent target could damage New Zealand’s wider  
foreign policy interests.
It is unclear how likely this is, what the impact would be, or whether the costs 
are greater than the costs of meeting the proposed target.
Source: Cabinet Economic Growth and Infrastructure Committee, 2015, appendix 6, Treasury
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further assessment of climate scenarios 
and the impacts of different targets and 
economic conditions. Importantly, this 
would also provide greater scope to consult 
with other countries on coordinated 
adjustments to INDCs and, in particular, 
to develop coalitions with key trading 
partners. Although this might counteract 
some competitive risks and enhance 
New Zealand’s international standing 
on climate issues, much depends on the 
government being assured that stronger 
INDCs will not damage its economic 
management credentials. Developing 
greater confidence here requires further 
analysis of the ways New Zealand might 
reshape its rather defensive climate policy 
narratives into ones recognising potential 
benefits for the country through stronger 
international cooperation and domestic 
policy.
International cooperation
International cooperation and 
partnerships would appear to provide 
several avenues to counter narratives 
related to New Zealand’s inability to 
influence global emissions and lack 
of major abatement opportunities by 
promoting emissions reductions at the 
international level. While activities in this 
area have focused chiefly on acquiring 
overseas units, another noteworthy feature 
of the Paris Agreement is the conditional 
goals included in many developing-
country INDCs. India seeks ‘to achieve 
about 40 percent cumulative electric 
power installed capacity from non-fossil 
fuel based energy resources by 2030 with 
the help of transfer of technology and 
low cost international finance including 
from Green Climate Fund’ (India, 2015, 
p.29). Similarly, Indonesia signalled its 
willingness to increase its INDC from 
29% below business as usual by 2030 to 
41% subject to technology development 
and transfer, capacity building, payment 
for performance mechanisms and access 
to financial resources (Indonesia, 2015).
At present, New Zealand’s contribution 
to the UNFCCC’s Green Climate Fund of 
around US$0.57 per capita looks modest 
compared with Australia’s US$7.96 and 
the UK’s $18.77 (Green Climate Fund, 
2015). Although striving for closer parity 
with other nations might boost New 
Zealand’s credentials as a donor nation 
and be regarded as an investment rather 
than a financial cost, this is only one of 
several climate finance flows, and New 
Zealand has also committed US$59 
million in fast-start climate finance, 
primarily bilateral grants prioritising the 
Pacific Islands and energy.
Either way, New Zealand has limited 
scope to make a significant difference 
through general climate finance. Greater 
opportunities, however, arise through 
targeted finance and cooperation 
activities where New Zealand possesses 
clear expertise. One example is the 
Global Alliance on Agricultural 
Greenhouse Gases, where New Zealand 
has allocated NZ$65 million over four 
years to capitalise on new research to 
reduce agricultural methane emissions 
(National, 2015). Per year $16 million 
is arguably still inadequate given that 
agriculture comprised 48.4% of national 
emissions in 2013 (and methane alone 
35.1%) (Ministry for the Environment, 
2013). However, it is perhaps indicative of 
broader opportunities for New Zealand 
to instigate and participate in what 
David Victor (2015) describes as ‘climate 
clubs’ – small groups of nations working 
together in parallel with UN agreements 
to develop innovative solutions to 
shared concerns. Among the tasks Victor 
envisages such clubs performing are 
providing forums for partner countries 
to ‘do deals’ that persuade other countries 
to make stronger efforts; creating flexible 
policy coordination with corporations on 
technological innovation and deployment 
in specialist areas; and providing 
demonstrations to encourage the wider 
adoption of low-carbon innovations.
While agriculture represents an 
existing – if underdeveloped – example 
of such coordination,5 New Zealand’s 
expertise in geothermal, hydroelectric 
and wind generation, and incentives for 
indigenous carbon sinks and plantation 
forestry also provides openings for 
international leadership on mitigation 
activities through the formation of 
climate clubs with other countries with 
under-exploited potential in renewable 
energy and forestry. Such overtures are 
likely to be more credible, however, if 
New Zealand also demonstrates progress 
in addressing key areas of domestic policy, 
in particular its ETS. Accordingly, the 
discussion now turns to domestic issues.
Domestic policy
The purpose of the government’s 2015–
16 ETS review is to ensure that the 
scheme supports achievement of New 
Zealand’s 2030 climate target. Its priority 
issue – the removal of the one-for-two 
surrender option for liquid fossil fuels, 
industry, stationary energy and waste – 
would tackle a chronic hindrance on the 
NZU price signal. However, the review 
rules out incorporating biological and 
fertiliser emissions from agriculture. The 
consultation states that the government 
will only consider this if: (1) ‘there 
are economically viable and practical 
technologies’; and (2) New Zealand’s 
‘trading partners make more progress 
on tackling their emissions in general’ 
(Ministry for the Environment, 2015b, 
p.5, emphasis added).
Addressing biological emissions from 
agriculture is nevertheless crucial to 
New Zealand’s future emissions profile. 
Although the consultation notes some 
innovations resulting from domestic 
and Global Alliance on Agricultural 
Greenhouse Gases investments, these are 
only foreseen as becoming commercially 
Full inclusion of agriculture in the  
ETS would align more clearly with  
New Zealand preferences for market 
solutions than the current rather 
anomalous exclusions.
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available in 10 –20 years, while the 
New Zealand Agricultural Greenhouse 
Gas Research Centre and the Pastoral 
Greenhouse Gas Research Consortium 
estimate $200 per tonne of CO2 
equivalent removed for some nitrogen 
inhibitors and a liability of agriculture 
entering the ETS fully of $272 million 
(PGGRS, 2014). 
Alongside cost, disagreements have 
mainly centred on points of obligation for 
agricultural emissions under the ETS. The 
government maintains that this should lie 
with processors, to limit administration 
costs, whereas farmers and processors 
generally support on-farm obligations to 
reward individual farms that introduce 
emissions-reduction strategies (Fonterra, 
2011). The cost differential has never 
been disclosed, but, based on there being 
an estimated 61,000 farms (Fairweather, 
2008) and previously calculated costs for 
processor- and farm-level monitoring 
(Agriculture ETS Advisory Committee, 
2011), on-farm obligations may cost 
an additional $140 million per year, or 
around $31 per capita. The real figure is 
likely to be lower because not all farmers 
would meet inclusion criteria, while the 
sector’s costs and vulnerability to changes 
in agricultural prices may also reduce if 
farmers cut production costs (e.g. by 
reducing fertilisers) and diversify income 
streams.
Full inclusion of agriculture in the 
ETS would align more clearly with 
New Zealand preferences for market 
solutions than the current rather 
anomalous exclusions. Introducing on-
farm obligations should improve cost-
effectiveness by expanding the number 
and range of NZUs, and improve 
abatement flexibility by applying price 
incentives directly to farms while leaving 
each business to determine where and 
how to reduce emissions liabilities, in 
keeping with narratives of climate change 
as a market externality. The additional 
argument for bringing biological and 
fertiliser emissions into the ETS relates 
to co-benefits, in particular combating 
water quality and soil erosion problems 
caused by dairying and other forms of 
agricultural intensification (NZAGRC/
PGGRS, 2015). Additionally, enabling 
the market through the creation of on-
farm obligations may persuade more 
farmers to reconsider the economics of 
specialising in areas that are susceptible 
to global price shifts, and seek out 
alternative income streams and land uses. 
Adler et al. (2015) further suggest that de-
intensification produces lower impacts on 
farm profitability than measures directly 
targeting biological emissions.
Among the more attainable options 
for diversification is through converting 
farmland to forestry to generate offset 
credits. Forestry became one of the most 
problematic elements of the ETS when a 
collapse in NZU prices in 2012 exposed 
weaknesses created by the scheme’s 
openness to cheap international credits. 
Greater emphasis on smaller, on-farm 
projects might reduce some of this 
volatility and should promote income 
diversification, though a price floor or 
limits on international units may be 
needed to persuade farmers to invest in 
forests. Even then, crop forestry remains 
susceptible to financial and carbon 
uncertainties created by planting and 
harvesting cycles (Bertram and Terry, 
2010); further support for permanent 
forests may help to address this problem, 
but would need to be backed by a 
concerted campaign to publicise the 
contribution of small-scale forestry to 
both climate and economic objectives.
A final underdeveloped area for 
domestic abatement is the transport 
sector. New Zealand’s high percentage 
of renewable electricity generation and 
potential for further expansion provide 
it with favourable background conditions 
for transport electrification compared 
with many countries, while research 
indicates strong public enthusiasm for 
electric vehicles (Ford et al., 2015). 
However, thornier challenges surround the 
political feasibility of sanctioning major 
infrastructure investments in private 
and public transport electrification, 
and how to address the tendency for 
New Zealanders to buy second-hand 
vehicles. Space constraints prevent 
detailed discussion of this issue here; 
however, progress on transport emissions 
is likely to remain slow without clearer 
government support. The extension of 
exemptions for light electric vehicles from 
road user charges until 2020 represents a 
small step in this direction, but further 
steps, such as commitments by the public 
sector to replace existing car fleets with 
electric vehicles (Price, 2016), would be 
needed to accelerate the uptake of electric 
vehicles and other forms of transport 
electrification.
Policy instrument choice and mixes
A final issue raised by interviewees was 
whether the ETS was capable of addressing 
all of New Zealand’s diverse emissions 
sources and areas of sequestration 
potential. Some argued that a carbon tax 
would offer greater cost predictability, but 
most conceded that a tax would face heavy 
political bargaining and could not be 
guaranteed to be more effective or cost-
efficient than an ETS. Some advocated 
a reformist approach, including a price 
floor, working on similar principles to the 
US$10 per tonne of carbon in California 
and the £18.08 applied to UK fossil-
fuel generators (Richter and Chambers, 
2014). Others, however, argued for the 
strengthening of sectoral measures 
alongside the ETS, particularly in areas 
requiring infrastructural investment, like 
renewables and transport.
New Zealand’s climate policies have 
been heavily criticised for focusing 
on cost-effectiveness at the expense 
of sustained investment in emissions 
reduction and building long-term 
economic resilience ...
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Either of these approaches would 
pose major challenges to key New 
Zealand climate policy narratives, which 
have stressed the financial implications of 
emissions targets and the virtues of the 
ETS as the primary (or sole) mechanism 
for achieving cost-effective, economy-
wide emissions reductions. Reforms such 
as those mentioned above are thus likely 
to gain traction only through new climate 
policy narratives that challenge the 
lenses through which climate issues are 
debated in New Zealand. Such narratives 
might include greater accent on: (1) the 
existential risks of climate change rather 
than the financial risks of mitigation; (2) 
the health, environmental and economic 
co-benefits of climate action, including 
the use of major infrastructure projects 
in transport and renewables to stimulate 
economic growth (Chapman, 2015); 
and (3) recognising that the structural 
reforms implied by climate change may 
exceed the capabilities of a single policy 
instrument.
Building support for such perspectives 
clearly requires political commitment 
and sustained communication about 
the social, economic and environmental 
consequences of climate change, and 
the benefits of complementary policies. 
Recent statements by the new climate 
minister, Paula Bennett, expressing a 
desire for New Zealand to ‘be a global 
leader in transitioning to a low-carbon 
economy’ and for a higher carbon 
price may indicate a shift in thinking 
(Simmons, 2016). Policy changes may 
indeed be easier under new leadership, 
but she will still need the support of her 
Cabinet colleagues and to draw skilfully 
on examples from other countries to 
persuade business and public audiences 
that higher targets, a stronger ETS and a 
wider range of policies would not damage 
the New Zealand economy. 
Conclusions
New Zealand’s climate policies have been 
heavily criticised for focusing on cost-
effectiveness at the expense of sustained 
investment in emissions reduction and 
building long-term economic resilience 
(Bertram and Terry, 2010; Richter and 
Chambers, 2014). The purpose of this 
article has been to deepen understanding 
of the factors contributing to this situation 
by probing key narratives shaping New 
Zealand’s approach to climate mitigation, 
and how these might be reinterpreted to 
help the country extend its emissions-
reduction commitments while still 
protecting its economy. The analysis 
supports the view expressed elsewhere 
that current policies score strongly on 
cost-effectiveness but have struggled to 
incentivise emissions reductions within 
New Zealand. Strong emphases were 
placed on adopting a more aspirational 
INDC and a clear emissions cap for 
the ETS to stimulate greater attention 
to domestic emissions-reduction 
possibilities and counteract over-reliance 
on international credits to meet future 
climate commitments.
The analysis also revealed several 
options for New Zealand to become a 
more active shaper of its climate future. 
In particular, the five-year review process 
established by the Paris Agreement 
creates openings for rolling assessments 
of the implications of higher INDCs 
and the building of coalitions with other 
countries to coordinate INDC increases 
so as to lessen the economic risks of 
higher targets. The formalisation and 
extension of ‘climate clubs’ for agricultural 
emissions, hydroelectricity, wind power 
and indigenous carbon sinks, meanwhile, 
provide avenues through which New 
Zealand could show genuine leadership 
in developing innovative solutions to 
shared problems while encouraging 
other countries to raise their mitigation 
commitments.
On domestic policy, the government’s 
reluctance to include biological emissions 
from agriculture in the ETS appears 
incongruous with New Zealand’s market-
led ethos and expertise in market 
solutions to environmental problems. 
Moving to on-farm obligations would 
increase administration costs and place 
new demands on farmers, but would 
also transform the ETS’s coverage and 
flexibility by allowing each farm business 
to determine cost-effective methods 
to reduce emissions while giving other 
sectors access to farm-based emissions 
reductions. It could also create important 
co-benefits linked to improved water 
quality, and provide new sources of 
income, particularly through small-
scale indigenous forestry, to help shield 
farmers from price shocks in international 
agricultural markets. 
But what might persuade the 
government to accept higher targets 
and reform the ETS, and climate policy 
generally? Statements in the Paris 
Agreement on the need to strengthen 
INDCs to keep increases in global 
mean temperatures to within 2°C of 
pre-industrial levels may provide some 
momentum, as may the adoption of 
INDCs by the US and major developing 
countries. Further projections and 
manifestations of the effects of climate 
change on New Zealand’s environment 
and economy may also contribute if 
supported by a sustained campaign 
to keep climate change in the public 
consciousness. Arguably, however, the 
decisive factor would be clear expressions 
in the latest ETS review of broad-based 
support for change, alongside ideas 
on how this could be achieved, to give 
the government greater political space 
to develop new narratives about New 
Zealand as an innovative nation capable 
of driving international and domestic 
responses to climate change. New 
Zealand has always prided itself on its 
resourcefulness and punching above its 
weight; why should climate change be 
any different?
1 Geoffrey Palmer describes New Zealand statutes governing 
actions on climate change as ‘in need of urgent attention’ 
and the ETS’s weaknesses as ‘notorious’ (Palmer, 2015, 
pp.20, 22).
2 The project was funded by the Research Council of Norway 
and led by the Fridtjof Nansens Institute, Oslo. The wider 
project involves a cross-national comparison of factors 
shaping the design of emissions trading in the European 
Union, California, China, South Korea, Australia and New 
Zealand, and opportunities for cross-national learning. Only 
results from New Zealand are discussed here. Our visit was 
kindly hosted by the School of Geography, Environmental and 
Earth Sciences, Victoria University. 
3 In addition, the IPCC notes that ‘conclusions for New 
Zealand in many sectors, even for biophysical impacts, 
are based on limited studies that often use a narrow set of 
assumptions, models, and data and hence have not explored 
the full range of potential outcomes’ (IPCC, 2015, p.1376) 
This means that some risks may be less than reported; 
however, local studies indicate that losses to residential 
and commercial properties from sea-level rise have been at 
the upper end of projected ranges (Reisinger et al., 2014, 
p.1384, Box 25-1).
4 The INDC falls outside the scope of the ETS review because 
the ETS does not include an emissions target.
5 Coordinated by the New Zealand Agricultural Greenhouse 
Gas Research Centre and the Pastoral Greenhouse Gas 
Research Consortium.
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